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MODERN TRENDS
IN LEGAL THEORY
ROBERT LEE KOERNER*
F REQUENTLY THOSE WHO desire most earnestly to save civilization,
unwittingly, but menacingly, become advocates of its ultimate destruc-
tion. We are constantly reminded that the real challenge to American
education is to equip youth with the scientific accouterments necessary
to ward off materialistic aggression. The highest goals in life are offered
in the field of technology. Not truth, but practicality seems to be the
common norm of human guidance.' Our fund of knowledge, as a result
of the phenomenal advance of the natural sciences is now so much more
real than the concept of society and of cultural relations, that we are in
danger of a pseudo-interpretation of personal attributes in terms of
impersonal nomenclature. Intelligence has largely become merely a higher
instinct, and a prey to every shifting wind of doctrine.
The process of progressive secularization, rationalism, idealism, rela-
tivism, positivism, pragmatism and collectivism denies, all along the
way, the essential nature of man, who is treated in various ways as the
creature of circumstance. As a corollary, law and government, the great
politico-philosophical agencies for the balancing of human relations
within the social milieu, become extrinsic to the individual, and truth is
reduced simply to logical consistency. Partly as a consequence of these
antinomies, it is probably a correct judgment that the United States has
no explicit, systematic legal philosophy or jurisprudence.
In a highly critical analysis of the caliber of the present member-
ship of the United States Supreme Court, Dr. William Frasca recently
commented:
*LL.B. (1930), M.A. (1937), Fordham University; Assistant Professor of Law,
Fordham University School of Business.
'"Those who are responsible for education have progressively removed from the
curriculum of studies the Western Culture that produced the modern Democratic
State; ... the schools and colleges have, therefore, been sending out info the world
men who no longer understand the creative principle of the society in which they
must live." Address by Walter Lippmann, University of Pennsylvania, Dec. 29,
1940, on file in University of Pennsylvania Library.
"... Natural Science was constituted a sort of supreme court before whose
tribunal all other branches of knowledge were obliged to plead their right to
recognition .... [T]he task that Natural Science had to fulfill was heralded as the
sublimest hope and the loftiest ideal the human spirit had ever aspired to."
DE HOVRE, PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION 4 (Jordan transl. 1931).
... [T]he stubbornness of the judges in con-
tinuing to close their minds to evidence and
viewpoints other than those of their own
choosing is compelling proof that personal
"prepossessions" rather than law - will
rather than reason - is the norm which they
serve. . . . Since the Court may only say
what the law is in isolated "cases and contro-
versies" as these come before it for decision,
the need for unitedly acknowledging and
firmly adhering to a set body of principles
is imperative if our entire constitutional sys-
tem is to maintain its coherency. The latter-
day tendency of the judges to travel each his
own merry way has thoroughly confused the
pattern of our law. Disdain for historical
fact and the belief that "the life of the law
is not logic" has completed the chain of
bewilderment. If the Court is to resume its
traditional place in the public's esteem a
re-examination of values should be the first
order of business.2
As against this criticism of one, but most
important, segment of the American legal
system, Charles McCoy has faithfully por-
trayed the general consequences of nearly
a century of megalomania of materialistic
scientism, in his article "American Political
Philosophy after 1865":
The politicial philosophy of this period is
not to be found, then, in any ex professo
treatinent of the subject, but is to be found
rather in a great miscellany of things - in
cultural changes, and in changes in the
applied sciences and mechanical arts which
constitute a civilization; and in the various
expressions of these changes, found in the
writings of scientists and scholars, in the
speecheg and writings of political leaders,
leaders in industry and labor and agricul-
ture .... 3
The ultimate result of this medley of
contributory factors, unrelated to any abid-
ing recognition of natural rights in the
2 Confusion in the Supreme Court, 28 THOUGHT
547, 569-570 (1953).
'21 THOUGHT 249 (1946).
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sound traditional sense of Scholastic doc-
trine, ushered in, at the turn of the century,
the impersonal corporate organization withi
its concomitant arrogation of economic
power over person and property.
The natural-rights doctrine which was
employed before the courts of the country
in defense of property rights and individual
liberty was the deeply distorted eighteenth-
century version whose basic assumption was
natural harmony of interests; and it was a
doctrine suited precisely to give scope to a
liberty unrestrained save by natural force
and selection. . . . At the same time the
effect of this policy was exactly to contribute
to the destruction of those natural bases of
society - the individual man with his intelli-
gence and feelings, the family and voluntary
associations - which the traditional medie-
val and classical doctrine of natural law
sought to preserve through good habits and
good institutions. Thus it was that we saw
grow up in the United States - and in the
name of natural rights and Americanism -
the impersonal corporation... [which] had
the effect not of serving the ends of human
life, but large capitalistic interests. 4
The gilded age of the gospel of wealth
had its fixation in American thought as the
philosophy of rugged individualism. Most
philosophic writers over the last half cen-
tury have, however, confused the Schol-
astic concept of natural law with everything
from canon law5 to Kant's postulates of
practical reason. 6 Hence, during the nine-
'Id. at 262, 267. The large quasi-public corpora-
tion in the United States has for better or worse
channeled the American "way of life," and has
assumed both social and political power over the
life of almost every citizen in the country. Wit-
ness the psychological dominance of the large
manufacturers in the field of advertising, particu-
larly that of television broadcasting.
WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NAT-
URAL LAW 5-6 (1931).
DEWEY, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 73-85 (1941).
Dewey is an excellent example, however, of how
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teenth century in the United States, the
notion of natural law-in morals fell largely
into disuse, not to say discredit, outside the
orthodoxy of the Catholic Church. During
the intervening years, until rather recently,
there has developed an increasing feeling
that, in principle, all that is meant by a law
of nature is a moral law to be applied to
the criticism and construction of positive
law, both legislative and judicial. This fal-
lacy of thought transference has been ana-
logously referred to in the scientific field,
as the "lyricism of science":
By the lyricism of science is meant the
transfer of the conclusions of one science
to which they belong, to another science to
which they have no application whatever.
Many and varied are the examples of such
a lyricism. When Comte hit upon the sci-
ence of sociology, philosophers sociologized
everything; when Darwin struck on a popu-
lar theory of evolution, thinkers evolution-
ized everything. Now, in our own times, the
quantum theory of physics has been applied
to religion by Professor Whitehead; the Ein-
stein theory of relativity has been applied to
the theory of knowledge by Lord Haldane;
the psycho-analytic method of psychology
has been applied to mysticism; and the prin-
ciples and theories of biology have been
applied to God. 7
In much the same way was the logical
development of legal history in the United
States as the judicial mind gradually slipped
away from the early American position of
associating secular affairs of state with
the viewpoint of a philosopher may shift as he
grows older. His earlier writings reveal a belief in
God and absolute reality. In the early 1900's his
philosophy adumbrated the problem of reflective
experience in human life, culminating in his later
works just prior to his death in the well-recog-
nized. empirical approach to methodology and
fixed thought processes.
' Sheen, God in Evolution, I THOUGHT 575, 580
(1927).
religious concepts." The notion of a definite
and universal moral law has been progres-
sively inconspicuous with the advancing
years, attendant upon the frank admission
that there is no substitute body of principles
of equal generality and adaptability to be
found.9 Instead, we have witnessed the
'The observation of Rev. James Gillis, made
a generation ago, is worth recalling in this con-
nection: "But the difficulty is that man cannot
invent a religion. He can and does invent philoso-
phies. Religion is prehistoric, primeval. Religion
is natural, instinctive, human. Philosophies are of
later origin, not natural but artificial. And one of
the predominating characteristics of our days, as
of the days of decadence in the Roman Empire,
is that religions are dying and philosophies reviv-
ing." FALSE PROPHETS 178 (1925).
The foreboding remarks of Merle Curti, in his
lecture on "Human Nature in American Thought,"
at Columbia University, epitomize the challenge
of uncertainty in modern thought:
"Perhaps it is another irony of American his-
tory that the scientific methods and techniques to
which we owe so much can also be used to incite
hysterical emotion and to make man's destruction
of humanity more efficient. Thus in the amazing
atomic age the retreat from reason has led many
to abandon faith in science. No substitute, no new
faith, has as yet been found which seems com-
pletely to fill the gap left by the retreat from rea-
son .... For the gulf between traditional Ameri-
can values and professions and actual individual
and social behavior seems to be ominously widen-
ing. We can of course say that the ideals so gen-
erously and eloquently expressed in the American
experience assumed too much and must be pared
down: But let us not pare down too much! For if
we do, we confess our bankruptcy." 68 POL.
Sci. Q. 492, 507-09 (1953).
And the comment of Geoffrey O'Connell is
hardly more sanguine:
"There seems to be a growing demand from
intellectual leaders on all sides for a new declara-
tion of the meaning and purpose of life in terms
of our changing democratic society. Educational
leaders like Dewey, Kilpatrick, Rugg, Bode,
Counts, and a host of others, openly professing
the tenets of naturalism, as well as insisting that
the solution of all our problems, economic, social,
and political, be arrived at by means of the meth-
ods of experimental science, are in the vanguard
of those clamoring for a change in our institu-
emergence of a multiplicity of amoral doc-
trines, largely contradictory, and espoused
either with incomplete conviction, or with
an inadequate postulate of legal principle. 10
The modern "philosophy" of American
law is, therefore, basically pragmatic and
deterministic," branching off into what
might be conveniently classified as three
distinct, but not wholly unrelated, schools
of legal thought: Sociological Jurispru-
dence, Legal and Economic Determinism,
and Legal Realism; none of which fulfills
the requirements of a complete doctrinal
system of law resting upon a true philo-
s'ophical psychology of human nature.
The School of Sociological
Jurisprudence
The sociological jurist has the praise-
worthy desire of satisfying the clamoring,
but ever-changing kaleidoscope of human
wants and desires, but he lacks an objective
determinant for evaluating the relative
merits of the interests to be adjudicated,
largely because of the constant attempt to
tions. . . . The highly important thing to be
noted, however, is that whereas yesterday mate-
rial prosperity and success were offered instead
of the Christian philosophy of life, today nothing
positive can be or is being offered in its stead,
because the economic crisis has shown the shal-
lowness of earth-bound hopes." NATURALISM IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION 241-43 (1936).
1 Much of this pseudo-philosophy is basically
naturalistic in the sense that it considers nature
the whole of reality, and humanistic in the sense
that it believes that man has emerged merely as a
result of a continuous biological process. What-
ever is transcendental of experience is rigorously
excluded, whatever direction the naturalistic trend
follows, whether that of Materialism, Evolution-
ism, or Positivism.
" "When studying modern American jurispru-
dence, it is well to remember that our legal
scholars are, in the main, inclined to avoid philo-
sophical disputes. They are not technically trained
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divorce sociology from social ethics. Frank
H. Hankins has stated the function of the
sociological method favored by this school
as follows:
The greatest need of sociology to-day as
in the past is to divorce itself from a priori
ethical considerations. As Comte said, "Ad-
miration and disapprobation should be ban-
ished with equal severity from all positive
science." In fact, on the basis of the rigid
determinism implicit in the positivist theory,
it is useless to inquire whether things might
not have been different. . . .Ethical phe-
nomena are only social phenomena of a
special class; they are always relative to the
social conditions of which they are a part. 12
From this point of view, law becomes,
under the persuasive advocacy of jurists
like Pound and Cardozo, merely an his-
torical instrument of legal engineering for
the practical admeasurement of rules and
principles according to the presently re-
ceived ideals of the times. Such "philosophy
of law" is thus purely subjective and uncor-
related to any objective standard of rights,
and is of necessity incommunicable to any
fixed frame of legal reference. Even the
in philosophy and not equipped to deal with ques-
tions not immediately connected with every day
practice .... By and large, American lawyers and
law teachers seem to proceed in the spirit of 'posi-
tivists'. They suggest that the analysis of the legal
order should not require any of 'non-legal' mate-
rials .... For them a Divine Plan, if it exists, need
not be consulted. They believe the law can be
analyzed and evaluated without requiring refer-
ence to such 'non-legal' objects or standards."
LE BUFFE & HAYES, THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 161-62 (1947).
2 Chapter on Sociology, HISTORY AND PROSPECTS
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 294 (1925).
On the other hand, Dr. J. V. L. Casserley has
recently insisted that "insight" based on inner
human experience is a greater source of knowl-
edge for the social scientist, and that the objective
of sociology is to understand, not merely to cor-
relate data. MORALS AND MAN IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (1951).
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late Oliver Wendell Holmes, considered by
many the outstanding jurist of the twen-
tieth century, who professed disdain for
all socialist theory, was the great exponent
of the sociological juridical school in his
recognition of force and feeling as the
foundations of law, rather than reason and
morality. Thus all thought of basing law
on objective principles of justice was rig-
orously banned from Holmes' legal philoso-
phy. So also the classic decisions of the
eminent jurists Pound and Cardozo were
mostly predicated on a voluntaristic basis,
assuming, as they did, that the cardinal
purpose of law is the satisfaction of the
largest popular demand, as ranged against
the smallest possible number of inconven-
iences. 13
The natural disposition of the -mind to
detect and apply universally applicable
principles is thus disavowed by the socio-
logical jurist, partly no doubt because of
the unprecedented progress of science
within the last half century, with its at-
tendant idolization of material valuation
immediately realizable; partly also as a
perpetuation of the doctrine of private
judgment in the realm of American case
adjudication. The failure here is in the
appeal of many judges, whether of the
professed stamp of the sociological school
affiliation or not, to legal history (stare
decisis), unrelated to any set of historical
principles, which incidentally cannot be
1 3 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS passim (Howe ed.
1953) (2 vols.).
The pragmatic, empirical complexion of the
late Justice Cardozo's legal philosophy is suffi-
ciently adumbrated in the following short quota-
tion from his Nature of the Judicial Process:
.... (W]hen the social -needs demand one
settlement rather than another, there are times
when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and
sacrifice custom in the pursuit of other and larger
ends." Id. at 65 (1932).
supplied or discovered by sociological proc-
esses, but only on the ground of a sound
metaphysics. To arrive at the truth or falsity
of any proposition, it is absurd to examine
it by its apparent consequences. 14 As Znan-
iecki, with his characteristic insight, has
put it:
Certain schools of psychology and soci-
ology have tried indeed to reduce cultural
evolution to natural evolution; but, as a
matter of fact, this reduction remains only
a postulate and .. .the essential and objec-
tively significant side of cultural life remains
forever inaccessible to naturalistic science.
On the other hand, certain idealistic currents
appealed to history for help in determining
the content and meaning of the absolute
values which they exposed and defended;
but they did not see that the historical and
absolutistic standpoints are irreconcilable by
their very logical essence .... 15
The apparent dichotomy between reality
and metaphysics is particularly well sensed
by O'Connell:
1 "... [1]11 conclusions can only flow from false
propositions; to know whether any proposition be
true or false, it is a preposterous method to exam-
ine it by its apparent consequences as if all
happiness was not connected with the practice of
virtue, which necessarily depends upon the knowl-
edge of truth; that is, upon the knowledge of those
unalterable relations which Providence has or-
dained that everything should bear to every other.
These relations, which are truth itself, the founda-
tion of virtue, and, consequently, the only mea-
sures of happiness, should be likewise the only
measures by which we should direct our reason-
ing." Burke, A Vindication of Natural Society,
1 BOHN's BRITISH CLASSICS 1, 6-8 (1854).
'" ZNANIECKI, CULTURAL REALITY 7-8 (1919).
History is, however, basically a continuous
process - the inner process of man, which how-
ever haltingly and awkwardly revealed, tends
toward the rational unification of the human
spirit. Hence the reality of social relations is not
a mere mechanical or organic integration of dis-
parate units, but is rather an historical, moral
matrix within the frame of man's essential human
nature.
It [naturalism] is an attempt to construct
a theory of life from the purely scientific
standpoint. It excludes metaphysics in favor
of the "view of the world which flows by
inner necessity from the accomplishments
of science." . . . It objects to metaphysics as
an abstract, mechanical, and hair-splitting
exercise of the mind. It believes that meta-
physics is a futile jumble of speculations...
resulting in no practical good. In contrast
with it, it extols the physical sciences and
their benefits to humanity. It fails to see that
metaphysics is occupied with reality, i.e.,
with things as they are, with fundamental,
basic notions and ideas. 16
And there are to be found, even within
the legal fraternity, those who have been
quick to appreciate the necessity for de-
limiting scientific findings in court trials by
rules of law resting on objective evidentiary
determinations. 1 7 The conservative Ameri-
can Bar Association Journal commented
editorially in 1949:
The critical problems and confusions
which our great transition is forcing upon
us compel us again to turn to-natural law
for eternal values and ideas of universal
"NATURALISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 2 (1936).
""Law enforcement should keep in stride with
the advances of science and courts should receive
scientific proof when presented in accordance
with the established rules of evidence .... In the
not too distant future this science may bring
civilization the horrors of a push button war, but
it must not bring push button justice .. " Justice
Ward, in People v. Offerman..204 Misc. 769,
774-75, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 179, 185 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
(Emphasis added.)
"What is not so clearly understood about the
process of reviewing the work of administrators
is that resort must be had to standards which the
legal profession has learned as part of its disci-
plined study and its pragmatic experience and
which can be formulated if at all only in the terms
of a tradition. . . .But a forecast based on an
informed professional synthesis is itself a science
and not only requires the dedication of intelligent
experience and objective thinking to the task, but
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application. . . . It seems high time, there-
fore, that we reexamine its basic concepts.
• . . We should listen to the counsel of
F. S. C. Northrop that "no problem in soci-
ety, science or life is fully understood until
its grounds in the metaphysical nature of
things are discovered." 1"
There is consequently a slow but grow-
ing realization, both within and without
legal circles, that a mere functional study
of institutions in the light of the social sci-
ences can never attain, as the sociological
jurists pretend, to the development of an
order of law as a social reality, without the
coordination of principles of human values
related to a common matrix of the nature
and purpose of man's existence and des-
tiny. There is, there can be, no such thing
as a legalistic historical process apart from
the basic consistency of human action as
motivated by free will and rationality. What
the law needs desperately is a philosophical
psychology of the abiding nature of man
in the various fields of human activity.
One of the merits of the sociological ap-
proach to law is to be found, however, in
its practice is the most significant way in which
the lawyer serves the community." Justice Bergan,
in Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Re-
gents, 280 App. Div. 260, 262-63, 114 N.Y.S. 2d
561, 563 (3d Dep't 1952), afl'd, 305 N.Y. 336,
113 N.E. 2d 502 (1953), rev'd, 346 U.S. 587
(1954). (Emphasis added.)
"To apply these cases [cited] to the facts at
hand is to ignore realities and to convert a ver-
balism into a philosophy. The law is not just a
joust with word symbols, and the use of language
never can excuse us from the necessity of search-
ing for the ideas and concepts language purports
to communicate." Justice Breitel, in Colgate-
Palmolive-Peet Co. v. Joseph, 283 App. Div. 55,
57, 126 N.Y.S. 2d 9, 11 (1st Dep't 1953), rev'd,
308 N.Y. 333, 125 N.E. 2d 857 (1955).
"35 A.B.A.J. 42 (1949). Another of the author's
articles in this connection is Koerner, The Chal-
lenge of Legal Supremacy, II REV. SOCIAL ECON.
105 (1953).
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its recognition of the difference between
the inert legal pronouncements in the text
books and law in action.' 9 But such vari-
ance goes far deeper than a mere tracery
of sociological correlatives through the ex-
ercise of judicial reason. The legal process
must become enabled to seek out the ulti-
mate perfection of man's being in order to
subsume reason rightfully within its func-
tion in the attainment of a sound decisional
basis in justice and ethics. As Rev. Moore-
house F. X. Millar, S.J., has expressed it:
Not only does he [man] seek by an inner
necessity to preserve himself in being, which
is the point at which our modern individual-
ists and would-be Liberals all stop, but he
tends further. With equal necessity he strives
toward the ulterior perfection of his being,
which is the precise point on which tradi-
tional Christian ethics stands out against a
revived rationalistic paganism and our own
modern naturalistic scientism....
In this way we see how, but for our intel-
lects, our wills would not be free, and yet,
owing to our intellects, our wills are not
without law. Such a law is initially discerned
by any intellect and becomes progressively
discernible to our practical reason in the
exercise of its function of evaluating human
experience. The intellect, therefore, is a law
that is constituted in our very nature as
human beings. This is what is truly implied
by such terms as the law of reason, the
natural law, or the moral law of our being.
It is by living in conformity with this law
""Much harm has been done to our common-law
technique in America by text writers in the deca-
dence of text writing in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, and by hack writers in ency-
clopaedias dogmatically announcing rules in terms
of the exact words of courts without attending to
the results of the cases as compared with the lan-
guage of decisions. . . . The most that can be
done is to measure action by its conformity or
want of conformity to a received authoritative
ideal, and that ideal itself must change with
changes in the society of which it is a picture."
Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1,7, 11 (1941). (Emphasis added.)
that man can gradually intellectualize his
being, can make himself reasonable. 20
What this implies in the field of juris-
prudence is that a natural law, with a
growing positive law content, is the proper
substitute for all merely analytical or his-
torical jural processes. Such ideals are not
to be developed outside the present legal
system, however. They are moral desiderata
and, as such, subordinate jurisprudence to
ethics, or, rather, supplement the moral
concept with its practical application in
prudence - the highest judicature. 21
The Deterministic School
of Jurisprudence
The movement of economic determinism
in the law began formally with Marx in
1859, but it did not impinge upon American
" The Dehumanization of Man, 17 THOUGHT 49,
59-60 (1942).
" That the struggle to infuse these concepts into
the present train of American legal principles will
have hardy antagonists is evidenced by Cornelia
Le Boutillier, in the work American Democracy
and Natural Law (1950), in which the metaphysi-
cal concept of natural law is implicitly assailed as
"semantically inept and practically useless." On
the other hand, certain criticism of almost any
legal system seems eternally justified.
The animadversion of St. Thomas Aquinas in
this connection, as far back as the thirteenth cen-
tury, is most relevant today: "The human reason
cannot have a full participation of the dictate of
the Divine Reason, but according to its own
mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as on the
part of the speculative reason, by a natural par-
ticipation of the Divine Wisdom, there is in us the
knowledge of certain general principles, but not
proper knowledge of each single truth, such as
that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so too, on
the part of the practical reason, man has a natural
participation of the eternal law, according to
certain general principles, but not as regards the
particular determinations of individual cases,
which are, however, contained in the eternal law.
Hence the need for human reason to proceed
further to sanction them by law." SUMMA THEO-
LOGICA, 1-11, q. 91, art. 3, ad. 1.
thought until the early 1900's. Whether its
present advocates belong to the idealist, or
to the mechanical branch of the movement,
the result is that all law is considered the
product of inevitable economic causation.
In government-controlled states like Russia,
this simply means that law is the will of the
economically dominant class; which again,
in Russia means the Kremlin.2 2 In the
western world, deterministic jurisprudence
represents the culmination of naturalism,
with its concomitant extrinsic, atomistic
interpretation of juridical power and rela-
tions, and its postulate of the inevitability
of class conflict as a conditio sine qua non
for social regeneration. Those assuming
political power by generalizing the objec-
S"Leninism-Stalinism ('Bolshevism') is not a
scientific hypothesis but a great social ideology
rationalizing the social interests of the new rulers
and making them acceptable to the minds of the
masses." BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLU-
TION 221 (1941).
The United States Supreme Court has upheld
the position that communism teaches the use of
force to gain political control, and advocates the
overthrow of the United States by force and vio-
lence. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1951).
The United States Internal Security Act of
1950 declares: "There exists a world Communist
movement ... whose purpose it is, by treachery,
deceit, infiltration into other groups (governmen-
tal and otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terrorism
and any other means . . . to establish a . . . dic-
tatorship in the countries throughout the world.
... The Communist organization in the United
States . . . present[s] a clear and present danger
to the security of the United States and to the
existence of free American institutions. 64
STAT. 987, 50 U.S.C. §781 (1952).
In 1951 the State of New York provided for
the removal from public office of persons holding
membership in subversive organizations. N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1951, c. 233. And since 1952, member-
ship in an organization designated as subversive
•by the United States Attorney General is deemed
so odious that its members are denied the right
to occupancy in certain public housing projects.
66 STAT. 403, 42 U.S.C. 1411c (1952).
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tives of their purposes, conceptualize them
in universal terms as principles of law or
legal doctrine.2 3 That such assumption is
easily calculated to foster the arrogance of
those seeking national, or even world dom-
ination, is sufficiently revealed through the
events of modern history. It readily be-
comes the methodology of dictatorial lead-
ers, which can include judges dispensing
the judicial process, in justifying their ap-
proach to a closed society. Carried to ex-
treme length, as in communistic Bolshevism,
this attitude of pseudo-deliverance can
reach an almost delusional intensity of
spirit, and should arouse at least a proleptic,
not to say prophylactic, interest in the
minds of all right-thinking persons.2 4
The Supreme Court of New York, in Gurtler
v. Union Parts Mfg. Co., pronounced this scath-
ing rebuke upon the communistic "philosophy":
"However heedlessly accepted in other democ-
racies and fearfully respected in benighted regions
of the world, the term Communism has come to
be recognized as opprobious throughout this na-
tion. By every means of mass communication,
Communism has been revealed in all its degener-
ate facets. We have taken its measure and know
it for its godlessness and its menace to the free
spirit and mind of man. A desperate faith in its
false panaceas, clung to by some in former years,
has yielded to a full awareness of its evil and its
peril.
"Quite apart from the legal bar to employment
in public offices, defense facilities and sensitive
industries, Communists are taboo in other areas
of employment. Organized labor seeks to purge
them from its ranks. In offices and stores, they
are undesirables. in most, if not all, of the learned
professions, a Communist is a pariah." 206 Misc.
801, 805-06, 135 N.Y.S. 2d 709, 713 (1954),
rev'd, 285 App. Div. 643, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 254
(1st Dep't 1955).
Actually, they consider objective law as a fig-
ment of the imagination. For an application of
the Marxist theory to the legal order, see lecture
by Brooks Adams in CENTRALIZATION AND THE
LAW 35 (Bigelow ed. 1906).
" "Society . . . cannot defraud man of his God-
granted rights .... Nor can society systematically
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The deterministic theory of law must,
therefore, be opposed in the free world by
the sound notion of community life, which
incorporates the idea of human dignity in
the individual person. The jurist, as psy-
chologist, must continue to observe mental
phenomena, but metaphysics must furnish
the rules for their interpretation, particu-
larly the rule of adequate cause and the rule
of sufficient reason. Psychology, to become
rational, must first become metaphysical,
because all science, including the science
of human relations and the law, demands
not only that the proper nexus between
facts be established, but also that the rela-
tion of the facts to their proper cause be
ascertained and applied.
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On a broad front the refutation of deter-
ministic proposals lies in the fact that they
are not directed toward the common good
from which law derives its nature and
sanction.2 6 The sociological refutation is
posited upon the distinction between mere
void these rights by making their use impossible."
Encyclical Letter of Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris,
para. 30 (1937). Because Communism does en-
croach upon human rights conferred by natural
law, it must be condemned as the basis of any
legal system, which "strips man of his liberty,
robs human personality of all its dignity . . .
[and denies] recognition of any right of the indi-
vidual in his relations to the collectivity ....
Id. at para. 10.
'The applicable standard laid down by Saint
Thomas Aquinas in his masterful work, Summa
Theologica, is objective truth as manifesting itself
to the mind. The practical adjudication of this
standard is governed by certain propositions of
universal character called metaphysical principles,
which are, in reality, the principles according to
which everybody should reason in ascertaining
the ordinary facts of existence. Hence, the objec-
tive test is as imperative for the psychologist, the
lawyer, or the judge in diagnosing the character
of an idea as it is for the physician in diagnosing
the nature of a disease.
"Law is "an ordinance of reason for the common
good, made by him who has the care of the com-
organizational, and institutional control. An
organization is maintained by a few in con-
trol of others - control either from above
or from without. An institution, on the other
hand, although it is also an organization,
has the further characteristic of being
founded in the habits and customs of its
members, and is supported and maintained
by the adherence of such membership to
the common unity. Although it exists by
will or free choice, it is nevertheless built
upon an ideal (the directive idea) made
practical through the habits of the individ-
ual members, commonly through tradition.
This latter element of tradition, as regards
the social bond relating a people together,
is frequently a much more potent condi-
tioning agent of community life, emotional
as well as intellectual, than the mere chron-
ological sequence of historical events, al-
though in a larger sense tradition itself is
part of history. Geographical conditions
are important directive agents, but are not
deterministic of human nature. Hence in-
stitutions do not merely reflect and express
social life, they also modify it profoundly,
and become the means whereby man's pur-
poses are determined depending upon the
objective content of their being. Although
set up by speculative reason, such institu-
tions are sustained by practical reason. 27
munity and promulgated." AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, I-I, q. 90, art. 4, concl.
'The remarks of Pope Leo XIII are pertinently
recalled:
"Reason sees that whatever things that are held
to be good upon earth, may exist or may not, and
discerning that none of them are of necessity for
us, it leaves the will free to choose what it pleases.
But man can judge of this contingency . . . only
because he has a soul that is simple, spiritual, and
intellectual . . . which is created immediately by
God. . . . When, therefore, it is established that
man's soul is immortal and endowed with reason
and not bound up with things material, the foun-
Philosophically considered, the theory of
legal determinism is also unsound in that it
regards man as absolutely determined by
the physical and economic order. Man,
however, while he is determined 'toward his
final end-God, is not determined as to
the method or manner of attaining such
end, which objective lies within the prov-
ince of free will. Man thus really conforms
to his nature when he conforms to legally
constituted authority, for the reason that
society is natural to man, and the state is
a natural institution. But it should be care-
fully noted, to avoid the subjectivism of
modern thought processes, that this author-
ity proceeds ethically from the institution,
and not from the individual wills of its
members, notwithstanding the fact that such
members may be judges composing the
institution of a .court of law. It is this
objective basis of obligation, implicit in the
directive idea of incorporation of the mem-
bers, either explicitly or implicitly; either by
compact or through tradition; which gives
to the institution its legal commitment. It
is only on such basis that the institutional
relation or relations can be legally inter-
preted and properly adjudicated. 28 It fol-
dation of natural liberty is at once most firmly
laid." Encyclical Letter, Libertas Praestantissi-
mum, para. 3 (1888).
2' There is here involved a moral.judgment which
must be objective and founded in the moral order.
It is in this sense that the Constitution of the
United States stands juridically outside its causes;
that is, it has an objective reality as a legal in-
stitution apart from all subjective interpretive
analysis of its. provisions. The principles of the
Constitution are thus immutably fixed as long as
the institution exists, but the interpretative judi-
cial decisions regarding these principles are not
immutable. They are subject to erroneous con-
struction, not the least cause of which may be
the particular political philosophy of the judge
in rationalization of his conceptual legalistic
knowledge.
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lows that the nature of the power to change
institutional relations must be determined
by the nature of the object which is the
subject of the change proposed. In cases
involving constitutional questions, such as
frequently arise in the United States, the
courts should attempt to ascertain the true
meaning of the Constitution as an objective
institution, in the light of the particular
facts upon which such cases are to be de-
cided. In the field of mutual consent or
agreement, the justice of a contract is to be
sought in its cause; institutionalized by the
will of the contractors, but existing inde-
pendently of such will as the objective basis
of the contractual relation. A juridical act
is thus necessarily referable to the object to
be adjudicated. Subjectivism and volun-
tarism have no place in legal interpretation.
Between the legislator and the subject
stands the common good - the only objec-
tive ground or nexus for determining
whether a law is sound. The situation gives
the rule.29
The philosophical view propounded takes
man for what he is; a human person, a
social being. The economic deterministic
view tries to socialize man. Hence the po-
tential danger of communism lies not alone
in the fact that it represents a powerful
political and social movement within the
progression of history, but rather more, in
the fact that it represents a pseudo-philoso-
phy of life, a falsification of human purpose,
evaluation, and destiny, which philosophy
is often found projected in the form of
decisions of law among which are the most
.0 "The situations in which men relatively stand
produce the rules and principles of that responsi-
bility, and afford directions to prudence in exact-
ing it." Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace,
quoted in HOFFMAN & LEVACK, BURKE'S POLrICS
460 (1949).
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potent agencies of control in the social
order.
The modern mind apparently has not yet
attained to the full recognition that there
is a vast domain of reality which is purely
relational in character; that the ideal order
is just as real as the material order. The
respective rights and duties of business
associates, or husband and wife, parent and
child, principal and agent, trustee and bene-
ficiary, to cite but a few of the well-known
legal relations constantly before our courts,
possess legal reality apart from the will of
those creating or engaged in such relations.
Thus personality as applied to a corporate
and social group is not a mere fictional
allusion or attribution, and it is even less
an illusion. It is, rather, a characterization
of its existential nature in reality within the
law.30 It is a recognition of the corpora-
tion's autonomy, and of its legal capacity
to play a part distinct from that played by
its participant members. A proper legal
evaluation of principle is especially de-
manded here because exactly opposing re-
sults will be reached by the courts depend-
ing upon the concept of corporate existence
which is employed.
The Realist Theory of
Legal Interpretation
The contest being waged in America
between the conceptualists and the realists,
between those who espouse an ideal legal
'Hallis, in his scholarly book, Corporate Per-
sonality (1930), reaches the conclusion that cor-
porate personality is a legal, but not a social
reality (p. 240). And Wormser, in his Disregard
of the Corporate Entity (1927), while conceding
that a corporation is a reality, denies that it is a
personality except by assumption of law. It seems
that both writers fall short of the full realization
that, whenever the law concedes legal personality
either to a group or to a human being, it is merely
recognizing the legal significance of something
which nevertheless exists in fact.
order and those who are content with law
as it is, is dividing jurisprudential scholars,
and courts, into two legalistic groups: con-
servative, and radical. The conflict may be
variously phrased as Transcendentalism
versus Functionalism, or Conceptualism
versus Positivism. The Realist program in
jurisprudence is a furtherance of the socio-
logical, empiricist approach to legal prob-
lems, particularly through psychological
rather than philosophical analysis. Law, it
holds, is ascertained by experience rather
than by logic. One of the better known
realists has intimated that the judge decides
the cause according to his prejudice or
pleasure, and then introduces a legal argu-
ment to support his conclusion.3 1 Natural
law principles - are deemed irrelevant in
realist appraisals of legal relations, as also
is the ideal factor in shaping law to a better
standard of conformance with the common
welfare. 32
The engineering process of the pragmatic
jurist has not been uncritically accepted in
modern American case law, however. 33
Nor has the attempt of the realists to di-
vorce their empirical method from the
institution of the English and American
common law system, in lieu of a system of
" FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 103
(1930).
' Further reference on this point may be made to
AQUINAS, Of the Power of Human Law, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, I-II, q. 96.
' "The horizons of our concepts in many fields of
the law are constantly widening. In torts, and
especially negligence, the changes by statute and
decisional doctrine have encompassed broader
areas. We impose liability now where none existed
a few short years ago .... Particularly marked is
the trend 'that the ethical quality of the defend-
ant's act is the measure of liability, not just the
final act done.'" D'Onofrio v. City of New York,
206 Misc. 644, 646, 124'N.Y.S. 2d 850, 852 (Sup.
Ct. 1953), rev'd, 284 App. Div. 688, 134 N.Y.S.
2d 569 (1st Dep't 1954).
free judicial decision, met with ready ac-
ceptance in present-day American legal
circles. 34 Notwithstanding this divergence,
however, there is still an apparent attempt
by some American courts to refer the objec-
tive content of legal interpretation to mere
common sense, with tie consequent sub-
jective indeterminism which this entails,
rather than to sound metaphysics.3 5
The objective due order is not being
used, to a large extent, by modern jurists.
in the process of adjudication of vital legal
issues. In its place are subgtituted either
an "ideal" of time and space, in the Spin-
ozian sense of projected reality, or a process
of quasi-scientific testing and re-testing of
evidential data in the hope that, through
sublimation and refinement of factual issues,
a more nearly perfect approximation of
legal principle will be reached. What is
lacking in this pragmatic approach to jus-
ticiable problems is the philosophical man-
date that principles must be ascertained
before they can be applied. The law is not
a mere prophecy of court action, either as
a profession of radical individualism or of
radical socialism. It is, on the contrary, an
instrument of authority, intrinsic to the
social nature of man, just as human nature
is both immanent within and transcendent
to the individual. Law in this sense truly
""The genius of the common law lay in its flexi-
bility and its adaptability to the changing nature
of human affairs .... Its flexibility consisted not
in the change of its essential principles, but in the
application of old principles to new cases and in
the modification of the rules flowing from them.
... Since its rules were founded in reason, one
of the oldest maxims of the common law was
that where the reason for the rule ceased, the rule
also ceased." Justice Nolan, in People v. Mortoi,
284 App. Div. 413, 419, 132 N.Y.S. 2d 302, 309
(2d Dep't), afl'd, 308 N.Y. 96, 123 N.E. 2d 790
(1954).
"GILLis, FALSE PROPHETS 192-93 (1925).
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becomes a rule of reason for the ascertain-
ment of principles of human conduct; prin-
ciples eternal, natural, customary, and
conventional, in the perspective of the
common good and the true unity of order
demanded by sovereign people under law.
Sound legal reform thus envisions a dual
unification: one immanent in the rational-
ity of the judge; the other transcendent in
the objective order of reality. Actually,
society demands more than one kind of
law to coordinate its multifarious relations
and activities. The Eternal Law, incarnate
in the Absolute Mind of God, also enters
rightfully into the human process of adju-
dication, and becomes part of jurispru-
dence. We are slowly beginning to realize
that an historically expanding human real-
ity is just as much evidentiary material for
legal contemplation as is an astronomically
expanding universe. The mind can never be
satisfied with a dry logical coherence be-
cause all objective reality is potentialized
in the individual, and finds in him its
epitome, which mere speculation however
veiled will not reveal.
And it is only through the traditions and
institutions of communal (not communis-
tic) life that a vital assimilation of reality
is possible. Reality is thus interiorized in
the individual, and the individual in turn
becomes a part of history. Hence there can
be no such thing as judicial auto-realization,
since a creative legal process cannot be
self-explanatory. It is in this light, and
within this perspective, that Scholastic
jurisprudence holds that positive law is a
facet of natural law which derives its sanc-
tion from the eternal law. Only within such
interpretation can the dignity of the indi-
vidual be maintained. Only on such con-
struction can a system of sound legal
interpretation survive.
